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ABSTRACT 
 
 This study looks at the real issue in the conflicts between time-bar 
provisions and prevention principle in construction contracts.  Prevention 
principle normally refers to acts of prevention which prevent the contractor from 
completing on time which resulted in time to be “at large”.  The employers 
introduced  conditions precedent or time-bar clauses to alert them to the 
contractors’ claims for delays and extension of time. However, prevention 
principle still presents a formidable barrier to the employers. It is not fair to the 
contractors because extension of time has not been granted and delay damages 
deducted merely because of the failure to give notice rather than for failure to 
progress with the works. This study was carried out mainly through documentary 
analysis of law cases reported in Lexis Nexis, construction law journals and 
articles. It does not cover concurrent delay.  Case law on this point is divided. In 
an Australian case of Gaymark v Walter Construction the court decided in favor 
of prevention principle. In a more recent Scottish case of City In v Shepherd 
Construction the notice requirement as a condition precedent overrides the 
prevention principle. When the conflict finally tested in England in 2007 in the 
case of Multiplex v Honeywell, the judge doubted that Gaymark was correctly 
decided and represents the law of England. In another case of Steria Ltd v Sigma 
in the same year the English court arrived at the same conclusion that the 
prevention principle does not mean that failure to comply with time-bar provision 
put time at large if the contract provides for extension of time.  The real issue is 
not so much on the conflicts between time-bar clauses and prevention principle 
but rather between such provisions and the doctrine of freedom of contract.  
Prevention principle is not a rule of law but merely a rule of construction and 
proximate causation analysis can exclude its operation if there is a properly 
drafted time-bar clauses. It is hoped that this study may help construction 
practitioners such as arbitrators and contract administrators in dealing with time-
bar disputes at a preliminary stage with less time and cost.  
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ABSTRAK 
 
 Kajian ini melihat kepada konflik di antara terma kontrak notis had masa  
dan “prinsip menghalang”. “Prinsip menghalang” merujuk kepada situasi di mana 
pihak majikan menghalang pihak kontraktor dari menyiapkan kerja-kerjanya 
dalam masa yang ditetapkan yang menyebabkan masa menjadi tidak pasti lagi. 
Pihak majikan memperkenalkan notis had masa sebagai satu amaran awal bila 
berlaku kelewatan. Namun “prinsip menghalang” masih merupakan halangan 
besar kepada majikan. Adalah tidak adil menidakkan hak kontraktor untuk 
lanjutan masa tetapi mengenakan denda hanya kerana gagal menghantar notis 
sebagaiman yang dikehendaki bukan kerana kegagalan untuk mejalankan kerja 
mengikut kemajuan yang ditetapkan.  Kajian ini telah dijalankan berdasarkan kes-
kes mahkamah yang dilaporkan di dalam Lexis Nexis, analisis dokumen kontrak 
pembinaan dan rencana. Ianya tidak melibatkan kes di mana kelewatan pihak 
majikan berlaku serentak dengan kelewatan pihak kontraktor.  Undang-undang di 
dalam hal ini berbelah bahagi. Di dalam kes Australia Gaymark v Walter 
Construction telah diputuskan bahawa prinsip menghalang ini lebih utama. Tetapi 
di dalam kes Scotland City Inn v Shepherd Construction telah diputuskan 
sebaliknya. Apabila konflik ini diuji di England pada tahun 2007 di dalam kes 
Multiplex v Honeywell, hakim memutuskan bahawa kes Gaymark  telah 
diputuskan dengan cara yang salah dan ianya tidak melambangkan undang-
undang di England. Di dalam kes Steria v Sigma pada tahun yang sama telah 
diputuskan bahawa  prinsip menghalang tidak bermakna kegagalan mematuhi 
terma had masa bermakna masa untuk siap menjadi tidak pasti jika kontrak ada 
terma untuk melanjutkannya. Isu sebenar bukanlah konflik di antara terma-terma 
tersebut tetapi lebih kepada kebebesan kontrak. Prinsip menghalang bukanlah satu 
peraturan undang-undang tetapi ianya lebih kepada bagaimana ianya terbina di 
dalam sesuatu kontrak dan analisis sebab utama boleh menyebabkan prinsip ini 
tidak terpakai jika terdapat terma notis had masa yang jelas. Adalah diharapkan 
bahawa kajian ini akan membantu mereka yang terlibat di dalam industri binaan 
seperti pakar timbang tara dan penyelia kontrak dapat dalam menangani  
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permasalahan yang timbul dari konflik ini pada peringkat awal pada masa yang 
singkat dan kos yang masih rendah lagi. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Background of Study 
 
There is a growing use of time-bar clauses in construction contracts in 
which they are generally provisions which require giving of a notice by a 
contractor usually within a specified period of time for to claim extension of time 
and loss and expense.  The notices are drafted as conditions precedent so that if 
the contractor does not give notices as required then he is not entitled to extension 
of time or is “time-barred”.   
 
The purpose of the clause is to cover all possible omissions or acts of 
default by the employer which would prevent the contractor from performing its 
contractual obligations.  Such clauses can also alert the employer to the 
contractor’s claim at an early stage so that the employer can take preventive 
measures to either avoid any delay or additional cost being incurred or ensure that 
the effects are mitigated as far as possible. The primary aim is to preserve the 
employer’s entitlement to liquidated damages if there is a delay to completion. In 
this study the time-bar and condition precedent phrases are used interchangeably 
and can mean the same thing depending on the context of the sentence. 
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In general, the contractor must take notice of properly drafted time-bar 
clauses and undertake careful commercial and contract management in order to 
understand the consequences of failing to comply as a properly constructed clause 
of this nature will be enforceable. In Bremer v Vanden
1
 Properly drafted time- bar 
clauses should be accompanied by a clear indication of the impact of failing to 
issue the notice and clearly state that the right would be lost in the event notice is 
not given. 
 
However, time-bar provisions have not worked as expected to the benefit 
of the employer who drafted it. The above position is contrary to a fundamental 
principle called “prevention principle” which says that a party to a contract cannot 
benefit from its own breach to the detriment of the other party. Despite the attempt 
by employers to protect their interests by employing time-bar clauses, the 
prevention principle still present a formidable barrier to them in enforcing the  
clause.  
 
It is thus argued that if the employer delays the contractor in completing 
the works, then generally he is not entitled to deduct liquidated damages for that 
delay because of his prevention acts that actually cause the delay to completion. It 
is even said that such a provision is a penalty because extension of time had not 
been granted and delay damages deducted merely because of the failure to give 
                                                     
1
 (1978) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 1-9 
3 
 
notice rather than as a consequence of acts of prevention by the employer which 
has hindered the contractor to progress with the works.  
 
The contractor will often argue that because notice is not served for 
extension of time, time will become at large and the obligation to complete by 
specified date is replaced by an implied obligation to complete within reasonable 
time. The employer cannot impose liquidated damages because time for 
completion has not been fixed for liquidated damages to run. The contractor also 
claim that notice for extension of time can still be submitted later when the effect 
of the delaying events cease to operate and there is sufficient information to make 
up mind. The contractor can also argue that in the project set up the employer is 
also well aware of what happenings on the project and should extend time upon 
happening of delaying event. What if the employer did not know he had caused a 
delay? Would the contractor still be right?  
 
On the employers’ side, it can be argued that if the contractor fails to give 
notice within the specified time as a condition precedent to its entitlement to 
extension of time, the employers have a right to the benefit of liquidated damages 
even though he is the cause of the delay. This argument is on the basis that 
extension of time cannot be granted if the contractor fails to invoke the notice 
requirement as a condition precedent in a timely manner. It was argued that even if 
the contractor fails to comply with the time-bar clause, it does not necessarily 
mean that the time for completion is at large. By allowing the contractor to rely on 
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the prevention principle as its defense, the contractor could disregard with 
impunity any provisions making proper notice a condition precedent. In such a 
scenario, the contractor could set the time at large at his own option. This is 
commercially absurd given that it would result in a contractor being better off by 
deliberately failing to comply with the notice condition than by complying with it. 
By allowing the contractor to submit extension of time later, it means to allow 
such claims and disputes to lie dormant and may be used as a ‘threat’ in 
subsequent settlement negotiations.  
  
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
To what extend has the prevention principle been successful to be used as a 
defense against time-bar clause? There is no direct authority (in English law or 
otherwise) on the question whether the employer can exercise his contractual 
rights and remedies where he has caused delay and the contractor has simply 
failed to follow the notice requirements. Because of the draconian effect of time-
bar clause, the English courts have always appeared reluctant to extinguish 
contractor’s rights to extension of time simply because of the contractors’failure to 
comply with the notice requirements. The courts have not always used the term 
prevention principle to defeat time-bar clause. The case laws in this area have 
either relied on the prevention principle or have simply failed to uphold time-bar 
clause. 
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The case laws in this area have been mixed and the results depend on the 
facts of each case and the wording of the respective contract. In an Australian case 
of Gaymark Investment v Walter Construction
2
, the Supreme Court of the 
Northern Territory of Australia has allowed prevention principle to deny the 
employer from benefiting liquidated damages for delays due to its own making. 
However, in a more recent Scottish case of City Inn v Shepherd Construction Ltd
3
, 
it was recognized that notice was a condition precedent and it was held that the 
contractor’s failure to give the notice meant that the contractor lost its rights for 
extension of time but the employer retained the right to deduct liquidated 
damages. It was said that Gaymark was wrongly decided because the judge failed 
to take note of the practical purposes of the condition precedent which was to alert 
the employer in the event of delay. Since then the courts have adopted a more 
flexible approach and view condition precedent clauses as a commercial bargain 
entered into with the full knowledge of both parties which should, as a result, be 
enforced.  
 
Since it is more common now to find contracts employing time-bar clauses 
such as FIDIC and NEC3, disputes will most likely arise touching on this issue. 
This study seeks to analyze the conflicts between conditions precedent and 
prevention principle and establish the real issue facing the construction 
practitioners such as arbitrators and contract administrators. 
                                                     
2
 (1999) 16 BCL 449 
3
 (2001) SCLR 961 
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1.3 Objective of Research 
 
The objective of this research is to establish the real issue in the conflict between 
notice requirement as a condition precedent and prevention principle. 
 
1.4 Scope of Study 
 
The research will focus on the following matters: 
 
1. The related provisions in the standard forms of contracts used 
internationally, namely FIDIC, NEC, JTC and amendments to them. 
2. Court cases related to the issue particularly cases in countries like 
United Kingdom, Singapore, Australia and Hong Kong and a few 
Malaysian cases. 
 
The study does not include concurrent delay which probably the most 
conceptually challenging aspect of delay analysis requiring a separate study. 
 
1.5 Significance of Study 
 
This study will encourage both parties to be familiar with contractual terms 
in particular condition precedent clauses and help them to understand their 
position better in regards to condition precedent clause and take necessary steps to 
avoid repeating past mistakes. Contractors must take notice of properly drafted 
condition precedent clauses and undertake careful commercial and contract 
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management in order to ensure they do not fall foul of these provisions. It hoped 
that better understanding by both parties will help reduce disputes which can be 
time consuming. 
 
1.6 Research Methodology 
 
 The research was done based on descriptive methodology through 
document analysis. Data collection was done by searching through Lexis Nexis by 
typing key words “building contract” and “condition precedent” to find case laws 
from England and other Commonwealth countries such as Australia, Scotland, 
New Zealand, Hong Kong and Malaysia.  
 
 From the previous court cases found, analysis was done to study the link 
between condition precedent and prevention principle to make inferences. 
Materials from text books and internet also were used to reconfirm and compare 
the understanding. The process is depicted as per Figure 1.1 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
     
      
               
     Figure 1.1 Flow of Methodology 
 
1.7 Chapter Organization 
 
This thesis consists of six chapters as outline below: 
 
 
 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW
 
DEVELOPING THE OBJECTIVE 
DATA COLLECTION – Through Lexis 
Nexis  
 
ANALYSIS OF DATA 
 
FINDINGS 
CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATION  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This chapter introduces the focus and direction of the research and gives 
background information regarding the problem under investigation. It also 
explains the important of notice as condition precedent and why it is worthwhile 
studying. It also presents the objective, scope, significance of study, methodology 
as well as the summary of the content of each chapter that will comprise the study. 
 
Chapter 2: Delay and Extension of Time 
 
This chapter explains the basic principles of grounds for extension of times in 
construction contracts, the relevant events, the meaning of time at large, liquidated 
damages and procedures for claiming extension of time and liquidated damages. 
 
Chapter 3: Prevention Principle 
 
This chapter defines and explains the basic principles of the prevention principle, 
when  and how it can be relied and cannot be relied by a contractor in advancing 
its claims against the employer.   
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Chapter 4: Condition Precedent 
 
This chapter gives the definition, purposes, importance and effects of condition 
precedent clauses and ways round it. It also looks at notices and certificates as 
condition precedent to payment, termination and imposition of liquidated 
damages.  
 
Chapter 5: Analysis and discussion  
 
It looks at the standard forms of contracts and sample bespoke contracts where 
condition precedent requiring notice to be served within a period specified. It also 
looks at clauses that are not expressly stated as condition precedent but can be a 
trap to the contractor. It then look at court cases to see how the clauses are 
interpreted whether it can be successfully argued against condition precedent 
clauses.  
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
This chapter discusses any limitation of the study and gives final recommendation 
– practical suggestions for implementation of the findings or for additional 
research that may be carried out to complement the findings of this study. 
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